```
C89QsokC1
 1
     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
 2
     -----x
 2
 3
     MARK I. SOKOLOW, et al.
 3
 4
                   Plaintiffs
 4
 5
                                           04 CV 397 (GBD)
                v.
 5
 6
     THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
 6
     ORGANIZATION, et al.
 7
 7
                   Defendants
 8
 8
     -----x
 9
                                           New York, N.Y.
9
                                           August 9, 2012
10
                                           11:00 a.m.
10
     Before:
11
11
12
                        HON. GEORGE B. DANIELS
12
13
                                           District Judge
13
14
                              APPEARANCES
14
15
     DAVID I. SCHOEN Attorney at Law
15
         Attorney for Plaintiffs
     2800 Zelda Road, Suite 100-6
16
16
     Montgomery, AL 36106
     DAVID I. SCHOEN
17
     MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED
18
18
         Attorneys for Defendants
19
     655 15th Street NW, Suite 900
19
     Washington DC 20005
20
     DAWN MURPHY-JOHNSON
20
     LAURA FERGUSON
21
22
23
24
25
                    SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
```

2 C89QsokC1 1 (In open court) 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Mark Sokolow v. Palestine 3 Liberation Organization 04 CV 397. 4 Please stand and state your name for the record 5 starting with the plaintiffs. 6 MR. SCHOEN: Good morning, your Honor. David Schoen 7 for the plaintiffs. 8 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Schoen. 9 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Good morning, your Honor. Dawn 10 Murphy-Johnson and Laura Ferguson on behalf of the defendants. 11 THE COURT: Good morning. 12 MR. FERGUSON: Good morning. 13 THE COURT: Let me first hear from defendants with 14 regard to the motion. 15 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Would you prefer that I come to 16 the podium? 17 THE COURT: It would probably be easier for the court 18 reporter. 19 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Your Honor, this is a complex 20 case that was filed in 2004 by 42 plaintiffs involving seven 21 attacks that occurred around Jerusalem between 2001 and 2004. 22 The complaint asserts 13 counts against the 2.3 defendants. The first count is a Federal Anti-Terrorism Act 24 claim. The second through 13th counts are a mix of non-federal 25 claims and a variety of theories of liability and theories of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1 damages.

2.3

 The defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs non-federal claims based on the defendant's lack of capacity to be sued for those claims. Those non-federal claims are the second count which is wrongful death, the fourth count which is battery, the fifth count which is assault, the seventh count which is negligence, the eighth count which is the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the ninth count which is the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs have also alleged in their papers that the sixth count, loss of solatium and consortium is a cause of action.

Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), the law of the forum state controls the capacity of an unincorporated association to be sued for non-federal claims, and here that's New York General Associations's Law Section 13 under which an unincorporated association cannot be sued in its own name. And here the PA and PLO, which are unincorporated associations, have been sued in their own names warranting dismissal of those claims.

THE COURT: Let me first start out with a basic question, because the PLO has been in litigation before and has taken different positions on that issue. Is it your position that you are conceding, admitting, acknowledging that the PLO is in fact an unincorporated association?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, your Honor, for purposes of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

 this motion, yes.

THE COURT: All right. That's not the way I phrased it, because for purposes of -- the real question is not for purposes of this motion. The real question is one of two: If that is what you acknowledge and admit, then that's going to be the PLO's acknowledgment and admission, and every judge is not going to have to go through this depending on what's to the advantage or disadvantage of either party in terms of what they want to assert. But this is really your affirmative defense.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Right.

THE COURT: So, you have to tell me whether or not you say that you're asserting this as an affirmative defense because in fact the PLO is an unincorporated association and acknowledges that and admits that and concedes that, and your position is there's significant evidence to support this court and every other court to make that determination for now and all time.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, as you are aware, your Honor, historically, the PA and the PLO have argued that they should be recognized as states or as nations, and routinely every court that's addressed that issue has rejected that.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: So, we have come to the point where we have to acknowledge that we are unincorporated associations because the courts refuse to acknowledge the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

defendant's status as states.

THE COURT: Well, let's put it this way, you have yet to convince a court that you have any evidence to demonstrate something other than that, so I'm trying to understand whether or not you -- again, this is your affirmative defense. It's not a question of everybody else has done it so I should do it too. It seems to me it's a question of fact, and either you say that that is the fact or you say that that is not the fact. It's a little awkward for me to have you argue that I should make decisions on that basis, not because you say it's so, but because you say other judges have assumed that to be the case.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Could I seek the Court's permission to have Ms. Ferguson address this particular question?

THE COURT: Surely. Whoever has a straight answer for me can address the question.

MR. FERGUSON: Ms. Murphy-Johnson is at a disadvantage because her exposure with the case is a little more recent than mine. I have been representing the PA since 2007. I am familiar with the litigation history of the immunity question, so if I could clarify. Predecessor counsel, since the lawsuits began in the U.S. against the PA and the PLO, argue that the PA should be treated as a sovereign state.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FERGUSON: And that argument really focused on the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

PA rather than the PLO. There is not really a conceivable argument that the PLO has any even quasi-state status, but the PA, they argued, as a quasi-state should be accorded sovereign immunity. And the courts acknowledged -- the courts found that the facts just weren't there to support it. In fact, the whole conflict is over the PA's desire to be recognized as a state. That hasn't happened yet. So, when my firm came in to represent the PA and PLO, we recognized that there was no sovereign immunity defense, and that the cases needed to be litigated on the merits. So, that's what we've proceeded to

So we are not making a state to a claim for the PLO. We are not making a state to a claim for the PA. If at some point the PA becomes a recognized state, that would be different, but here and now the PA is not a recognized foreign state.

THE COURT: That's even not my issue. I am not asking you whether you contend or don't contend in this litigation that the PA or PLO is a sovereign state. That's not the question. The question is solely the question of whether or not -- I mean, it has been debated back and forth in almost every single case in which the PLO is in, not just the issue of whether it's a sovereign state, but because the determination of whether it is or isn't a sovereign state is not a determination that it is or is not an unincorporated SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1 association.

2.3

 The only question before me is whether or not in fact the PLO and the PA have the status of being an unincorporated association. If that is your position, whether or not it is or isn't a sovereign state, whether or not for all purposes -- for purposes of service, for purposes of standing, for every other purpose -- if you are urging me to make the conclusion that you say is acknowledged by the PA and PLO, that you are in fact an unincorporated association.

MR. FERGUSON: There is only a certain number of potential baskets the PA and PLO can fall within.

THE COURT: I mean, I don't know.

MR. FERGUSON: We are not a corporation, not a partnership, not a state.

THE COURT: If you say so.

MR. FERGUSON: Right. Yes, I think the best framework for these are sui generis entities is under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and unincorporated association, and that's how the courts have treated the PLO, how the Southern District of New York treated the PLO in the Klinghoffer case. That's how the District of Columbia has treated the PA and the PLO in the Kliman and Parsons case, as unincorporated associations. We accept that designation. And even the plaintiffs have acknowledged the PLO is an unincorporated association.

THE COURT: Well, but that is where I have to start SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

2.3

24

25

because I have been asked basically to take judicial notice of this fact. While I can take judicial notice that the other courts in their resolutions of the issues that were before them 3 4 said for the purpose of those issues that the PLO is an 5 unincorporated association, that isn't quite judicial notice. 6 I'm not sure that it's appropriate for me to take judicial 7 notice that that is in fact true because another judge has 8 ruled that way. If that was the case, I couldn't disagree with 9 my colleague next door because they ruled one way and I've 10 decided to rule a different way. I can take judicial notice 11 that they've ruled that way, but I can't take judicial notice 12 that that's either a fact independently or that that is the 13 legal consequence for all time in every case or even if I had 14 made the same decision, given the same set of circumstances 15 that I would have made the same judgment.

So, as I say, my attitude is it's more in the hands of the PLO and the PA as to what it is that you say the facts demonstrate that you are rather than an argument that simply you've made the opposite argument and have lost that argument, and so, therefore, since you've lost the argument, everybody else has to accept it in every litigation even though your position might be different.

MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, I don't think there is much dispute or uncertainty about what the basic facts are of what the PA is or what the PLO is. The question is, how do you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

categorize that sort of sui generis entity for purposes of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

THE COURT: Well, no, I think that there is --look, the fact is that it may or may not be my role, but I know what's going to happen; that if you are going to argue to me, literally, and I think it's appropriate, it's time to stop debating this issue depending on whether it's to the advantage of some plaintiff or the advantage of the defendant.

If you want me to accept the fact that the PLO is in fact an unincorporated association, then you're going to have to tell me that, and you tell me that it is and tell me why it is, and tell me the evidence supports that, and my guess is that people are going to quote this back to you in future litigation because I don't think it's appropriate for me to have you tell me that I should make that determination and the consequences for that determination in this case, and then you represent that to me in this case, and then the next case if it's not to your advantage for either service or some other purpose, then you want to make the opposite argument because, you know, this is not --

MR. FERGUSON: I accept that, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- it's not so much a legal argument. It is a fact; either you are an unincorporated association or you're not an unincorporated association, and you have to tell me whether or not you believe it is so, and you have to tell me SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

on what basis you believe that, particularly in this context because this is your affirmative defense.

MR. FERGUSON: Right. I believe the PLO is an unincorporated association. I believe it should be treated as an unincorporated association because it is sort of an umbrella group for a variety of political parties and factions who share a common purpose of a Palestinian national movement with recognition of a Palestinian state. It's not incorporated. It is a loose affiliation of members who share a common purpose. So it best falls under the rubric of an unincorporated association.

THE COURT: On what basis do I even have in this record at this stage of the proceeding to say that the PLO has members? Who are the PLO's members?

MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, I could first say that the plaintiffs have acknowledged the PA is an unincorporated association. Their argument is that the law where it is -- where the association was formed to govern its capacity to be sued, but they don't contend that it's not an unincorporated association. There is no dispute between the parties about the PLO's status.

But with respect to the membership of the PLO, the PLO represents all the Palestinians, including the Palestinians that are in the Diaspora, so those that are not in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And they represent all those SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

 Palestinians who share in the Palestinian national movement.

THE COURT: That's not the definition of an unincorporated association. The fact that they take the position that they represent the interest of all of those individuals does not make all of those individuals members of the PLO. That is not the definition of an unincorporated association for legal purposes.

MR. FERGUSON: Well, I can refer the Court to the Kliman decision in the District of Columbia where it concluded that the PLO fell within the definition of unincorporated association precisely because it's composed of individuals without a legal identity -- I'm quoting from the Kliman decision from the District of Columbia.

It has been determined by other federal courts that the PLO qualifies as an unincorporated association because it is "composed of individuals without a legal identity apart from its membership formed for specific objectives." Citing the Ungar decision from Rhode Island and also the Klinghoffer decision from this court.

So, with respect to the PA, again, it's this problem of a sui generis entity. It has an executive branch. It has a legislative branch. It has courts. It took the position we are close enough to a state, we should be treated as state for some purposes. That's been rejected.

THE COURT: I understand that.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

MR. FERGUSON: So that's why I accept that the next best framework is unincorporated association.

THE COURT: But there is no such thing as a default framework. You see what I'm saying? So you can't say that because it's not an apple, it must be an orange. That's not the way it works. As I say, you have to tell me why you say it's unincorporated -- is your position that the PA is an unincorporated association?

MR. FERGUSON: Yes, it is, and because we have to pick a set of rules that govern capacity to be sued, that govern service of process, that govern immunity, and we have to define for U.S. law purposes how we're going to treat the sui generis purposes for purposes of applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

THE COURT: But you are defining that because you give me a set of factors that meet that definition, and then you tell me why the PA or the PLO meets those factors. It's not an analysis that if the PLO or the PA has been rejected, it's one thing, they must be by default something else, that's an unincorporated association. That's not true. Because if you're not a state, you could be a corporation. You could be, you know, a partnership. There are a lot of things you could be depending on the facts.

So, the question is not, you know, is there a space to push them in. The question is what is the nature of the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1 organizations, and in what way does the nature of that organization meet the requirements of being an unincorporated association? Now, you know, this first question may be much 3 4 ado about nothing because when I ask them the same question, 5 they may say to me, well, Judge, that's what we think they are, 6 and then they have to give me a good reason then why they 7 shouldn't be treated that way for all purposes. But I just want to first start out with the premise 8 9 because almost every other case you've cited to me in which the 10 court ruled that -- and not in all contexts, but in most 11 contexts it had to deal with the issue of service, but there 12 were some cases that also had to --13 MR. FERGUSON: The Parsons case specifically addressed 14 the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to be sued for 15 non-federal law claims. 16 THE COURT: But in every one of those cases, my 17 recollection is -- and you correct me if I'm wrong -- in every 18 one of those cases the PLO and the PA took the opposite 19 position, said that they were not. 20 MR. FERGUSON: That they were not? 21 THE COURT: Unincorporated associations. 22 MR. FERGUSON: I don't think that's the case in Parsons, your Honor. 23 24 THE COURT: You think the case in Parsons -- I have to 25 look at that, but I don't -- I'm not sure they even SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

specifically took that position. Maybe in Parsons they took the position for the purpose of capacity and  ${\mathord{\hspace{1pt}\text{--}}}$ 

MR. FERGUSON: In Parsons we did not argue sovereign immunity. That was one of the recent cases that was filed -THE COURT: Right. And my recollection was that not in Parsons that you said -- I don't know if you were in Parsons.

MR. FERGUSON: I think how we framed it is that the PA and the PLO -- or especially the PA has argue stages. That has been rejected. The PA accepts that that's the consistent ruling of the U.S. courts and, therefore, the PA should be treated as an unincorporated association, as the court did in Kliman.

THE COURT: I remember everything that you just stated except the fact that you say you accept that. I'm not sure that I read -- I don't know what the underlying position was, but in the case law that I read, I am not sure that you said we accept the fact that we are unincorporated association. Obviously, you wanted the benefit of excluding the cause of action, the underlying cause of action, if that was what the finding was going to be, but I'm not sure that you urged upon the court that in any of those cases that the PA and/or the PLO was in fact an unincorporated association.

MR. FERGUSON: I can tell you that the PA is no longer standing on sovereign immunity claims and takes the position SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

that it's best treated for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an unincorporated association, and that's what the courts consistently have done.

THE COURT: Well, best treated is not --

MR. FERGUSON: Well, it's not a corporation. It's not a partnership. What is it is the problem.

THE COURT: Well, no, I understand that, but the question before me is not what it's best treated as. The question before me is whether you have an affirmative defense of lack of capacity to be sued because you are in fact an unincorporated association. Isn't that really the only issue for me at this point?

MR. FERGUSON: There are two issues before you. One is whether there's a capacity to -- whether the PA and PLO have the capacity to be sued. The second is whether the Court should decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

THE COURT: But I haven't gotten to that yet.

MR. FERGUSON: But with respect to the capacity question, yes, a threshold determination undoubtedly is that the PA and PLO are unincorporated associations. I don't think there's any dispute as to the PLO.

As to the PA, you know, it's a group of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and there is a governmental structure there, but it is not treated as a state.

THE COURT: But as you just described it is not the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

16 C89QsokC1 1 definition of an unincorporated association. 2 MR. FERGUSON: The question is then how do we 3 determine this thing's capacity to be sued and how it should be 4 served? 5 THE COURT: I don't know, but that's not my issue at 6 this point. The only issue for me right now is whether or not 7 in fact the PA should be dismissed from this case because --8 MR. FERGUSON: Certainly we're not -- right, the 9 Anti-Terrorism Act may continue the court case. 10 THE COURT: Yes, I misstated it. Whether or not 11 the -- I'll call them the common law clauses of action. 12 MR. FERGUSON: Right. 13 THE COURT: The common law causes of action should be 14 dismissed because it is an unincorporated association and the 15 law indicates that an unincorporated association does not have 16 the capacity to be sued. 17 MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, I can't stand here and kind 18 of neatly tick off the elements of the PA and sort of link them 19 directly to a definition of unincorporated association. Courts 20 that have looked at this issue have found that that's the best framework. That's really all I can offer you. But if this 21 22 seems too -- you know, the fact that the PA is so sui generis 2.3 that it makes it difficult to resolve the capacity argument, 24 then that is really sort of another reason that the Court 25 should not take on the seven non-federal law claims because,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

17 C89QsokC1 1 again, this is another aspect of the complexity that these 2 claims bring to the case. 3 THE COURT: Then the way I am trying to analyze it is 4 that may or may not be -- that may be correct, but the question 5 is, does that mean that this can be resolved at this stage of 6 the proceeding rather than at a later stage of the proceeding. 7 MR. FERGUSON: I cannot contemplate any discovery that 8 would shed any light on whether the Palestinian Authority 9 should be treated as an unincorporated association. The Oslo 10 Accords that set up the Palestinian Authority are widely 11 available. They're a matter of public record. So the 12 structure of the PA is well-known. There is no discovery that 13 would aid this inquiry. Ultimately, we're left with the sui 14 generis entity and we have to decide what basket it best fits 15 into. I recognize this is a novel question and it doesn't fit 16 neatly into any of the baskets, but that's what we're left 17 with. I think I've hijacked Ms. Murphy-Johnson's argument. 18 THE COURT: Go ahead. 19 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: I am looking at to where we 20 should next go. THE COURT: I mean, your basic argument is fairly 21 22 straightforward. 2.3 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: It is. 24 THE COURT: And your basic argument is that -- if I 25 articulate it correctly -- that the PLO, that you have an SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

 affirmative defense that requires no further factual examination, and that affirmative defense is that the PLO and the PA are unincorporated associations, meet that definition for all purposes, and, therefore, whatever rules apply to an unincorporated association with regard to the common law claims should apply in this case.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Correct.

THE COURT: Fairly straightforward argument. I can accept that if everyone says to me that that's the way the issue is to be viewed. As I say, it doesn't make the case go away. The only thing I disagree with initially in terms of the proposition is that I think all of the claims that you ticked off, other than the last claim, would fall into that category because I'm not sure that -- was it Count Six?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm not sure that Count Six would qualify as an independent cause of action.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MS}}$  .  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MURPHY}}\xspace{-{\mathsf{JOHNSON}}}\xspace:$  Right, and we take that position as well.

THE COURT: They can explain to me if they think that that's an independent cause of action, but I don't know of any underlying elements of liability that independently prove to demonstrate that as an independent cause of action unless you've established an underlying cause of action. That seems to me to be also related to the issue of damages. I thought SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1 that the plaintiffs pretty much argued that or at least lumped 2 that into the same category as the other claims, but maybe not. 3 Hold on just a second. 4 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Your Honor, if I might --5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: -- in the plaintiff's opposition 7 to our motion -- this is DE-196 at page 3 -- the plaintiffs 8 grouped Count Six in with what they characterized as 9 garden-variety non-federal causes of action. 10 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Where are you looking, at page 11 3 of their response? 12 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Oh, I see. Yes. Then I will discuss that 14 with them. All right. 15 Well, if you have anything further to say you want to 16 say about the standing issue, then I will hear you; otherwise, 17 let's just talk briefly about your argument that I should not 18 assert supplemental jurisdiction. 19 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Certainly. We'll shift gears 20 then to that argument. 21 So, independent of this capacity issue, the defendants request that the Court nonetheless decline to exercise 22 2.3 supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's non-federal 24 claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367 which states that the Court can 25 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if non-federal SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

claims raise complex questions of foreign law or if they would come to substantially predominate over the federal claim at issue in the case.

We strongly feel that that is what would happen here. The case is already inherently complex on the federal grounds alone. There are seven different attacks involved over a period of three years, all involving different factual scenarios, potentially different militant groups allegedly involved. There are 42 plaintiffs.

THE COURT: So why should I double that?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Why should you quadruple that? Quintuple that?

THE COURT: Right. But my question is different than your question. You are asking why should I quadruple that in this case. I'm saying why should I quadruple that in two to four different cases? What sense does that make? Why should you have to go through this twice, here and in another jurisdiction?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, because here doing so would mean engaging experts on potentially up to four or five different foreign bodies of law --

THE COURT: Well, they argued that -- look, as I said, this isn't rocket science. Wrongful death is wrongful death. What expert do I need to tell me -- I don't see any place where you argued, one, that -- well, I'm not quite sure what your SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

 position is as to where these supplemental claims should be litigated and what law should apply.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: The question of what law should apply is actually a very complicated one since the Second Circuit issued its decision in the Licci matter. I don't know if I'm pronouncing that correctly.

THE COURT: OK.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: There the Second Circuit held that the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest on litigation should be applied. And then tort cases such as negligence intentional infliction of emotional distress where conduct-regulating rules apply, the law of the location where the tort occurred applies.

THE COURT: Who is going to make that determination? And what are you urging that determination to be?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, if I could, I'm not sure that it necessarily warrants a definitive determination. I think that the question itself presents so much complexity and we could engage in years of litigation over which law actually applies.

THE COURT: But why? I understand that in the abstract, but I don't understand how that applies to this case, and I am not sure how it makes it more efficient to do that in two or three different forums when we're all talking about the same underlying activity --

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1 1 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Sure. 2 THE COURT: -- that just translates into different causes of action. I mean, their argument is this: That there 3 4 are only two choices. You are either going to apply New York 5 law or you're going to apply Israeli law. I don't know if you 6 say there is a third choice, but you haven't articulated a 7 third choice, so at least we've narrowed it down to two 8 choices. 9 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: If I might articulate that now. 10 As we attempted to articulate in our June 6 letter to the 11 Court, because of the Licci decision, it does appear that there 12 is another alternative here, aside from New York law and 13 Israeli law, and that would be however we would characterize 14 Palestinian law because that is where the PA and the PLO at 15 least for some part --16 THE COURT: Where do I look to find Palestinian law? 17 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, yes. That's how --18 THE COURT: Where does any forum look to find 19 Palestinian law? 20 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, I will tell you. 21 THE COURT: Wait. Stop. So, you are saying that 22 there is such a thing as Palestinian law that's been applied in

not an expert on Palestinian law. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: I can't say for sure because I'm

a court of law to resolve these disputes?

23

24 25

C89QsokC1

2.2

2.3

THE COURT: Well, you got to say for sure, otherwise, I can't accept that argument. You can't just make it up.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: I'm not making it up.

THE COURT: Well, that's as I say -- let's put it this way: They argue that there are certain injuries and deaths that occurred in Israel, so, therefore, under normal circumstances, given the fact that there are U.S. citizens, that the -- and I characterize them as the common law causes of action will either be causes of action under New York law or causes of action under Israeli law. In the first instance that makes sense.

You say now that there's something else called Palestinian wrongful death law that is somehow different than Israeli or New York law that some court needs to go through -- and I'm not sure which court you say needs to do that -- but some court needs to go through and determine what that is in order to litigate that issue. Is there something called Palestinian wrongful death law?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Just like everything else in this case, that is also a complicated question, and I know that's not helpful to you.

THE COURT: It's not a complicated question. It's a very simple question. If you can tell me there is such a thing, then I will say, all right, then somebody has to analyze that. If you can't tell me that you have a basis to say there SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

is such a thing, then why is that a consideration for me?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Over history, depending on what foreign nation has governed the region, those various countries' laws have been exercised in the Palestinian territories, and over a time they've all become layered on top of each other.

So, for conduct that occurred in the Gaza Strip, arguably Ottoman Law could apply because at some period of time Ottoman Law governed that region. And if certain conduct occurred in the West Bank, there could be a combination of British Mandate law, Jordanian Law, Israeli mililtary orders or Israeli law, but this has all been --

THE COURT: Well, what does that have to do with the plaintiffs wanting to invoke and having available to them to invoke either the laws of Israel or the laws of New York? If your argument is that they cannot establish their cause of action under one of those laws, then you may prevail on summary judgment or before a jury in being able to convince the Court or a jury that, no, protections of those laws do not apply here. But what does that have to do with my declining to assert jurisdiction over this? How is this somehow easier for some other court to deal with and address than this Court?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: The plaintiffs themselves believe that they could potentially bring these cases, the non-federal claims, in Israeli courts.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

THE COURT: Right.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: But I'm not saying that the choice is solely between -- and if this court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here, that it's a question of choosing between New York law and Israeli law. My only extra additional point is that if this Court were to address these claims, there is likely this third body of law that's developed over the past several decades in the Palestinian courts involving all these different layers of foreign law.

So my point is, that if the Court were to accept supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, even the choice of law issue alone adds so much complexity to an already complex case that there is no doubt that these non-federal claims would come to predominate over the federal ATA claims.

THE COURT: But I don't understand in the detail of that argument what that argument means. It sounds superficially logical, but what is it that this Court has or any court has to determine? They will invoke -- and you will either agree or disagree -- that they have the protection of either New York State common law or Israeli law, and they will say that we can prove that those laws do apply and should be applied and we can prove our cause of action under those laws.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: But I think under Licci that that is not accurate any more because the defendants -- if the defendants solely committed their tortious acts in Israel, then SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1 under Licci, Israeli law would arguably apply. But there is a 2 whole list of allegations in the complaint that the PA and PLO from their headquarters, which are not in Israel, acted 3 4 negligently to, for example, release prisoners who then went on 5 to allegedly commit these acts. 6 THE COURT: OK. 7 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Or paid people from their 8 headquarters, which are not in Israel, to commit acts. 9 THE COURT: What does that have to do with a cause of 10 action for negligence? 11 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: I'm sorry? 12 THE COURT: I'm just trying to pick a cause of action. 13 Explain to me how that complicates any one of these causes of 14 action. 15 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Because then the PA or the PLO 16 acted in the West Bank negligently to release a given prisoner 17 who then went and committed an attack. 18 THE COURT: But that's not the nature of anyone's 19 claim here. 20 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: I'm sorry? 21 THE COURT: That's not the nature of anyone's claim 22 here. 2.3 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: It is. 24 THE COURT: Whose? 25 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: The plaintiffs have alleged that. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.2

2.3

 THE COURT: Have alleged what?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: That the PA or the PLO have released certain people who were in their custody intentionally for the purpose of committing acts of terror.

THE COURT: OK. Maybe I have to go back to the complaint again. I will accept your premise for now, but I'm not quite sure where you say that that requires some other alternative choice of law.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, that's what Licci tells us. In Licci the question was -- and, unfortunately, it was a question between New York law and Israeli law, so I don't want to cabinet in those terms, but there the court found that American Express had acted in New York.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Those acts then resulted in rocket attacks in Israel, but New York law applied because New York is where American Express took its actions. So what I'm saying is Palestinian law, however one eventually comes to define it, would apply to any claim that the plaintiffs have that the PA acted tortiously within the Palestinian territories.

THE COURT: So who is supposed to decide, and why is it somehow more convenient for some other court to decide that -- and even more convenient for the parties for some other court to decide that rather than in the case in which you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

28 C89QsokC1 1 litigated already the issues with regard to the injuries and 2 deaths for the crime? 3 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Because if it were litigated 4 here, it adds a substantial layer of complexity. 5 THE COURT: How? All I have to do is decide if you 6 weren't giving me Ottoman Law. In their brief it says Ottoman 7 Law applies, and, therefore, this is your defense, I'm sure I 8 could decide that. That wouldn't take any more time than it 9 has taken me to decide any of the other motions that I have to 10 decide. 11 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Because I think, your Honor, it 12 would become so much more complex because of the number of 13 claims involved, the number of plaintiffs involved, the 14 theories of liability, whether it's direct liability or 15 respondeat superior. 16 THE COURT: That's going to be true whether or not the 17 supplemental claims went somewhere else or not. 18 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: True, but on top of that we would 19 have to hire experts. 20 THE COURT: You're going to have to do that anyway. 21 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: We're going to have to have 22 translators. Everything is in a foreign language. 2.3 THE COURT: You're going to have to do that anyway. 24 I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you, but I'm trying to 25 focus you on this issue. Part of my analysis is, you're saying SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

 that -- and you're not saying that I'm required to do it or you have a right for me to have to settle this on this basis. I have the discretion to do this, and you're asking me to exercise my discretion appropriately to do this.

My question is, first, if I do this, I must consider whether there is a reasonable alternative forum for the parties to litigate this dispute. What do you claim is the reasonable alternative forum that I should decline jurisdiction over these claims so that those claims can be litigated in another forum? Do you understand my question?

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: I do understand your question, but to tell you the truth, I'm wondering if that is more appropriate if this were being raised as a forum non conveniens argument.

THE COURT: But I can't imagine that it would be appropriate for me to act properly and not abuse my discretion by declining to assert supplemental jurisdiction over what would otherwise be valid claims if the consequence of that is that the plaintiff has no forum in which to litigate those claims.

 $\,$  MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Well, the plaintiffs themselves have said that they believe that Israel could be a proper forum for these claims.

THE COURT: But you say no.

MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: No. I'm saying that Israeli law SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1 1 might not necessarily apply; not that Israel might not be the 2 proper forum for the claims. 3 THE COURT: So are you saying that I should decline 4 jurisdiction over these claims in order that the plaintiffs can 5 re-assert these claims in an Israeli court if they wish. 6 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Correct. 7 THE COURT: All right. That's all I'm trying to say. 8 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: OK. Let me see if there was 9 anything else. 10 THE COURT: All right. Let them respond because I 11 have some questions for them, and then I will let you respond. 12 MS. MURPHY-JOHNSON: Thank you very much, your Honor. 13 MR. SCHOEN: Your Honor, I'm David Schoen, and I represent the plaintiffs. I see the Court has read the papers 14 15 thoroughly, so I don't intend to just reiterate what's in the 16 papers. I'd actually like to start at a different place than I 17 intended originally, just to respond to a couple of things that 18 were said, and maybe the lead line is, quite frankly, a comment 19 the Court made. This applied to Section 1367, the choice of 20 law argument. The Court said -- I'm paraphrasing -- it understands this argument in the abstract but does not 21 22 understand how it applies in this case. That's it in a 2.3 nutshell. 24 That's exactly, with all due respect, what happened 25 here. A number of legal arguments were thrown against the wall SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

to see which stick, but when you break it down to this case, none of them applies to this case. We don't get, for example, to the choice of law issue and these so-called complicated questions of now we hear Palestinian law or Israeli law because they've never shown there was a conflict between New York law and those laws. In fact, the Court well versed in these issues commented in the Licci case that the Court is familiar with Israeli law, and when it comes to these kinds of things, there really isn't any difference.

But I heard some things today in the argument that, quite frankly -- and, again, I mean it with all due respect -- I was quite surprised to hear. For example, we heard from Ms. Ferguson today the rather shocking proposition which turns everything on its head that if the -- I'm paraphrasing again -- the fact that the question of whether the PA is an unincorporated association is too difficult to really determine should argue against hearing these claims, should make you dismiss these claims and send it away because we can't tell if it's an unincorporated association.

The defendants have missed their burden here completely and missed the appreciation of their burden in all regards.

Again, as the Court noted, we can't appear before this court and say, well, one argument didn't work; therefore, maybe this one will work, and then flowing from that should be the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.2

2.3

prejudice to these plaintiffs because contrary -- and I know she believed it when she said it -- but contrary to what Ms. Murphy-Johnson said, we don't say these claims can be brought in Israeli court today. We say that's part of the extreme prejudice that's happened in this case because they waited so late to raise these things, the statute of limitations has run in the Israeli courts, and we submitted an affidavit from this Jeremy Stern to that effect.

THE COURT: Let me start you with the basic premise that I started them with. Is it your position that they are or are not an unincorporated association?

MR. SCHOEN: It is my position that they are not, and it's my position primarily that they have the burden of establishing that they are, and on this record they certainly have not done that.

THE COURT: Well, I'm in the same position with you as I am with them is that your position is inconsistent and inconsistent -- understandably inconsistent because it is one way depending on what's to your advantage. Now, the position has always been consistently for service purposes and for other purposes that they're an unincorporated association.

They argue, and I don't think you directly addressed the issue -- they argued that you served them on that basis, OK? And that's the way you proceeded on that basis, and, therefore, you would like to consistently cite every court's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

ruling that they're an unincorporated association for the purpose of service; but then when it's to be applied to the causes of action, now you want to say, oh, they can't prove that. Well, what do you claim is their status?

 $\operatorname{MR.}$  SCHOEN: Respectfully, your Honor, let me explain why I believe there is no inconsistency.

We've taken the position that they are not a governmental entity entitled to sovereign immunity, but that, as the Court said earlier, doesn't lead to the conclusion that for purposes of New York law they are an unincorporated association with members, therefore, not subject to suing or being sued.

And, with all due respect, the argument on service that the defendants have raised is simply wrong. We didn't serve them or assert that we served them as an unincorporated association. Under Rule 4(h) that's the catchall for organizations. Frankly, the argument works in our favor. Why? Because Rule 4(h) says it applies to organizations or associations subject to suit under a common name. They have never challenged that part of it. If they're subject to suit under a common name, that tears asunder their argument that they're not an entity operating under a common name. Their argument is we need to -- when you're talking about an unincorporated association, it's just a loose conglomeration of members and, therefore, you need to get the approval or SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

ratification of every member. Well, if there is anything to be drawn from Rule 4(h) it is that it authorizes service for an organization or association subject to suit under common name.

Again, let me get to a little more basic question. The defendant said, well, it's complicated. We're not sure what to look at. Maybe we should look at Palestinian law. We're not sure what to look at about whether they could sue or be sued because it's complicated.

Well, how about a basic created document, the Oslo Accords that created the PA and that the PLO negotiated with the United States. It could not say more expressly that the PA is an entity authorized with the power to sue or be sued. Again, I don't think you could have it both ways.

What are they trying to do? They're trying to say in New York they don't have the right to sue or be sued because it's an unincorporated association. Well, I would suggest to the Court, with all due respect to the defendants, that the fact that it is this quasi-governmental entity, which is what they argued in the Knox case and how the court in Knox treated them. I can give the page cites for that. It's 306 F.Supp.2d 424 to 435. Either they're that or they're this other kind of organization. Well, that's exactly why the Court in cases like the Massachusetts Trust case that we cited and other cases in the reply, that's exactly why the Court said if they don't really fit into what we call an unincorporated association with SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 2.3

24

25

the members, and, after all, it's the membership that makes it where you can't sue them. You have to show approval by the individual members because it's such a loosey-goosey organization, but in the Massachusetts case, we say we look then how were they treated back home? And back home that organization that they argued was an unincorporated association, had the power to sue and be sued.

They said, wait a minute now. That's going to be unfair if we go to Massachusetts, and so we're not going to treat them like an unincorporated association here. Whatever they're called -- again, we have to analyze it under New York law specifically.

THE COURT: But every court that has opined on this issue for any purpose relating to any legal question, has determined that they qualified as an unincorporated association. What authority are you citing to me that would give you a basis to argue in law or in fact that that is not the case?

MR. SCHOEN: I'm telling the Court, respectfully, that none of those courts has analyzed the question in this framework. It says it in Parsons. The decision they submitted. It says the defendants haven't shown us any reason otherwise. It wasn't analyzed or argued.

THE COURT: It wasn't analyzed or argued, but that status was applied to them in all of those cases to both the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

advantage and disadvantage of both sides.

MR. SCHOEN: I'm saying, your Honor, I know that this Court is fully capable of analyzing the question on its own, and it has been presented and framed here. Again, the burden is on them. They have shown no membership. Who are the members of the PA? Who are the members of the PLO? And, again, respectfully, we do not concede that for purposes of New York law and this question under New York law that the PLO is an unincorporated association. There's reference made to it as an unincorporated association on page 17 of our papers, but then if you go to page 18, we say they haven't shown they have any members. So, while it might be called unincorporated association for some purposes, under New York law they've got to show they've got members and so on. And, frankly, if you had to show -- if we had discovery on the case, and they said, well, what would they determine in discovery? I suppose we have a laundry list, starting with their charter and the right to sue and be sued. How do they operate? Who are their members, and all that?

Frankly, if their members are what they said in their United States Supreme Court brief that the PLO is an umbrella organization of different factions, well, frankly, every one of those factions has a charter that would condone, ratify or approve this kind of terrorism that occurred in this case.

THE COURT: Well, my direct question to you is the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

same as to them: Is it your position that they are or are not an unincorporated association?

MR. SCHOEN: It is my position that as that term is used in New York law for these purposes, they are not. They are something like a quasi-governmental entity as the Court treated them in Knox in analyzing the question. They are not -- we have seen no proof on this record that they are a voluntary membership organization any more than any administrating authority, whether it's the Port Authority here or a governmental authority like a county government, is a voluntary membership organization. Its constituents, it has said, are all the factions of the Palestinian people. That doesn't sound or look like a voluntary membership organization. If they have the proof, they haven't made that proof.

But all of it, again -- by the way, I just wanted to take one or two baby steps back. That is, I know the Court is aware that we also have pending motions to strike these affirmative defenses on procedural grounds, and specifically with this issue, a waiver issue, because this issue was raised a long time ago in a subject matter jurisdiction motion which was denied, and then didn't appear again in the next series of motions to dismiss that we saw, and it's coming up now. That's relevant both for waiver and for the exercise of this Court's discretion because one of the many important factors for this Court to consider is the prejudice that arose from the way in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

which the defendants have engaged in their litigation of this case specifically with respect to that issue, and that means throwing these folks out of Court and throwing these claims out of court; not just for the plaintiffs who are non-Americans, but for the American plaintiffs that wouldn't be able to have the benefit of these kinds of claims which have different elements from the ATA.

THE COURT: Well, that may go to your argument of whether or not they should be allowed to dismiss those claims on this basis at this time, but the plaintiff was put on notice that they had an affirmative defense.

MR. SCHOEN: In the answer, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHOEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, there is no prejudice in the sense of surprise that at some point during this litigation they were intending to put forth that affirmative defense.

MR. SCHOEN: Your Honor, is distinguishing between surprise and prejudice because that answer was filed after the statute limitations would have run in the Israeli courts, so we didn't have another forum to go to.

THE COURT: But I can't fault them for that aspect of it, as long as their answer was timely filed, whether or not it was timely filed in relationship to the statute of limitations some place else is not their fault. They get to timely file an SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

answer, and they get to assert affirmative defenses that they say they're going to rely upon in defending this lawsuit. So, it may be prejudice to the plaintiff, but it's not undue prejudice.

MR. SCHOEN: I follow your Honor. My suggestion was that the waiver argument arises because there were motions to dismiss -- and this issue had been discussed -- and there were motions to dismiss before the answer was filed, and this wasn't raised in those, and we say they abandoned it by not raising it.

THE COURT: That may be a waiver of the motion to dismiss. It is not a waiver of the affirmative defense.

MR. SCHOEN: But I think it puts us in the position of assuming that issue isn't going to be in the case any more until it arises again in the answer years later. That is, if we have to evaluate at some point on our own, well, could it be that they are going to argue lack of capacity down the road, therefore, we have to cover our bases and file in Israeli courts in case somehow a court dismisses these things down the road. No reason to believe that until the answer is filed. When they filed other motions to dismiss when this subject the lack of capacity had been raised earlier, that motion was denied in the context of subject matter jurisdiction motion --sorry -- had been denied and then subsequent motions to dismiss are filed, it's not raised again. I'm just saying in terms

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

of --

2.3

THE COURT: But that's what I'm saying, I want to understand your argument. I understand that argument to be a waiver of a subsequent motion to dismiss for lack of capacity.

MR. SCHOEN: I follow you, your Honor. Your Honor is being very precise.

THE COURT: It is not a waiver of an affirmative defense because they have not yet filed an answer asserting affirmative defense, and as long as they still have the right to file an answer asserting their affirmative defenses, it doesn't automatically -- as related to your other motion automatically say I'm supposed to strike their affirmative defense because they didn't make it in a motion to dismiss.

MR. SCHOEN: Your Honor is being very precise and absolutely correct, I believe.

However, that brings us to the other argument again about how they raised it in the answer. As your Honor is also aware, we have raised this argument, and under Rule 9 they fail to allege it with particularity and with the supporting facts that are required. We cite the cases in the brief that require that kind of allegation. We can't just throw out there lack of capacity.

I know I've skipped all around. I would like to just kind of put in a nutshell a little bit the first argument and just reiterate what our arguments are on this unincorporated SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

association, and then I would like to just put in a nutshell our 1367 arguments, and then I would like three minutes to discuss with the Court why in all of this, and especially in the exercise of the Court's discretion, it makes absolutely no sense to dismiss these cases for any of the prudential reasons that courts sometimes dismiss what I, in the old days, called pendent supplemental jurisdiction to dismiss those kinds of cases in this case.

On the unincorporated association, as I say, fundamental position after we get past the waiver and all that -- and that would be one way to decide it is on waiver -- is that the burden is on them because they're looking here for an escape for these claims in this case. They have the burden of proving that they are an unincorporated association under New York law. And that doesn't end it. It's a matter of capacity, even if they are an unincorporated association that they don't have the capacity to sue or be sued. That's relevant here because they are this unique sort of animal, let's call it -- unique sort of entity, both the PA and the PLO.

So, again, I say with respect to the PA, you look to the organic document that created them. It says expressly, which the PLO negotiated for, we have the right to sue and be sued. Again, we don't have to guess because we pulled a series -- doing discovery on our own, we pulled a series of about 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

 to 14 case necessary which the PA has sued. They're the plaintiff in 10 to 14 cases at least. That was just in one glance in the Israeli court. So they recognize they have the right to sue and be sued.

So what we say in this argument is when you're dealing with, even if it's an unincorporated association  $\mbox{--}$ 

THE COURT: Slower.

MR. SCHOEN: I'm sorry. If it's a foreign unincorporated association -- and by foreign, I just mean a non-New York unincorporated association -- we have to look to how that entity is treated back in its domicile. Those are the cases we've cited that they take issue with, and we cite it again in the reply later on. I can give the Court the cites to pleadings and all that, but, again, I can see the Court has read them all. So that is an answer to that.

The 4(h) argument we've discussed. The only reason I raise it is because they've tried to claim mileage out of that saying well, they served it under 4(h) as an unincorporated association. That's the catchall for organizations. Again, it undercuts their argument because it only applies to groups that can be sued under a common name. Their position is we can't be sued under a common name. You got to name our president or treasurer and then prove all the members approved it or ratified it. That's a different kind of entity.

I think that pretty well covers it. Again, they have SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

 the burden of showing what it is and of establishing that they are members, or, as the Court alluded to, or suggested -- I don't see that the Court came to any conclusion -- as the Court threw out as an issue, isn't it fundamentally a question of fact? If it's a question of fact, then we have no business deciding it at this point. Certainly nobody has been prejudiced and nobody would be prejudiced by having it go forward all the way through.

In fact, two of the five plaintiffs, who they claim shouldn't have any claims here on their demand, on the defendant's demand, have flown over to New York, have had their depositions taken on damages, and have had Rule 35 examinations taken already at great expense and great inconvenience to them.

On the Section 1367 argument, your Honor, first of all, again, we don't even get there. There has been no showing of any conflict of laws in the first place. Why is that important? Because they rely on two prongs: They rely on the prong that you have the discretion to get rid of these claims if it raises a novel issue, that sort of thing.

Let me just read from 1367, your Honor.

Their claim is that "this case raises a novel or complex issue of state law" -- you know, some jurisdiction other than the federal court -- "and that the claim or Subsection 2" -- I'm reading from 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(1) and (2).

The first one says "it raises a novel or complex issue SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

of state law." The second one is "these claims substantially predominate over the claim or claims over which the district court has jurisdiction" -- the ATA claims.

"The last proposition, cannot be supported under any reasonable good faith argument that these garden-variety claims of wrongful death and assault and battery would predominate over this thing."

What they mean is, well, we would have to apply foreign law for them, and they would predominate because we'd all get bogged down, as Ms. Murphy-Johnson said, in having experts in here for two or three years with foreign law and all that. Nonsense. I don't mean that disrespectfully, but it's a nonsensical argument because we don't get to the first part.

First of all, case law ad infinitum, and the commentators all say, as the Court said earlier, when we're dealing with torts, contract claims, and that sort of thing, these are not the kind of novel or complex issues that are contemplated by Section 1367(c). That's right out of Wright & Miller and cases that they cite.

On the second part of it, will they predominate, this is the classic case in which the state court claims are intertwined -- inextricably intertwined with the federal claim. The proof is the same. The evidence is the same. You go through one trial with no difference except maybe the elements are more simple than in the ATA.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

But, again, let's talk about the burden. The first burden is on them to prove that there is a conflict between New York law and Israeli law or Palestinian law. And to say to the Court today, well, now we don't know what law would apply in Palestinian territories — they are the law. They're the legislature there. They are the courts there. They have the burden to tell the Court. It can't just be let's throw it against the wall, and in the abstract we could have an issue here, and it could be real complicated, maybe Judge. Can't tell you why. Can't tell you how. Can't tell you what the differences are or what that body of law is, but, you know, in the abstract, that could be out there; therefore, Judge, why don't you just get rid of these things and makes things simple? That's not the way it works, the Court knows that, and it's not fair.

Another relevant question: Would it enlarge the scope of the action at all? Not at all. Not at all. Let me explain. I think the best way for me to explain what I mean by that, it will take me about three minutes because I want to concretize it and put it in real terms. I want to tell the Court who the five plaintiffs are that we're talking about and how their claims arise to perfectly, I believe -- not me -- the facts perfectly demonstrate the point I'm trying to make here; both why it wouldn't complicate the case at all and why it's perfectly appropriate for these claims to be in this case. In SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

fact, this is the classic case.

The first plaintiff -- we're talking, again, about five plaintiffs on these claims. The first plaintiff is Guetta. In January of 2001, just outside Jerusalem, four men with Kalashnikov machine guns opened fire on a car in which Varda Guetta was traveling with a 14 year-old son Oz. The shooters got out of their car and they fired at the Guettas' car just a few feet away. Varda got a close look at some of them. We intend to prove in this case that those men were officers with the PA Police Department Security Forces. Many of them are now sitting in jail for carrying out similar attacks in that same area. The son, Oz, was struck with machine gun bullets and has serious injuries. He is an American citizen and has an ATA claim. Somehow, miraculously, the bullets missed Varda, but she has significant mental health issues, as they know from depositions, and, as a result, she has a physically and emotionally crippled son. And she deals with that every single day.

It would be unfair in the extreme to deny Varda the opportunity to present her claims from this same incident in which the claims for her son's injuries are going to be presented. She has claims for the emotional distress. She has claims for the loss of consortium, the loss of her mother/son relationship as it was over the last ten years. So it doesn't add to the scope of this case because the evidence will be the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 2.3

24

25

same. The evidence will be that she was there and what she suffered. So, yes, if we have to put on some damages evidence about her, that can increase it a little bit. That's not the kind of thing we talk about in why we have to get rid of these claims because they would predominate.

I'll make it real quick on the others. In the Bauer incident we allege in March 2002, a suicide bomb blew up on King George Street in downtown Jerusalem. Dr. Alan Bauer and his young son, Yehonathon, were injured severely and several Israelis were killed. Again, two officers in the PA Security Services, Abdel Akrim Aweis and Nasser Shawish were convicted of planning the attack and sending the bomber. They proudly admitted it. This is one of those cases in which General Zinni handed the PA a list of known terrorists, people who were committing these acts. They locked up Aweis for about a week or two and then released him. They knew who he was; they knew what he was going to do.

The story gets even worse. Let me cut to the chase here. Alan Bauer and his son, Yehonathon, are Americans. They had ATA claims. But Revital Bauer, who is Alan's wife and Yehonathon's mother, is not American. She only has the non-federal claims. So, again, she'd be out of court, but there's no reason for her to be because this case is going to be tried here and now with all of the same evidence at trial.

Goldberg is the third case. January 2004, a PA SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

policeman Ali Jara got into the number 19 bus in Jerusalem. The attack was planned, we allege, and we will prove, by two other PA policeman, Achmed Salah and Halmi Hamash, who were convicted and got multiple sentences for it. Among those murdered in the bombing was Stuart Scott Goldberg. He was Canadian. So his estate doesn't have an ATA claim, but his wife and seven minor children, who are American, do. They have their ATA claims here, and they will be litigating it. So what an absurd result to throw the estate of the fellow who was murdered out while the relatives will be in here and have the right to be in here.

Finally, there's the Mandelkorn case, which are two of the plaintiffs. There in June 2002 a suicide bomber blew up in a crowded bus stop in Jerusalem, killing a group of Israelis and wounding plaintiff Shaul Mandelkorn. He's not American, but his father, Rabbi Leonard Mandelkorn, is American, and, therefore, the father has a claim under the ATA; but since Shaul is not American, he doesn't have a claim, nor does his mother under the ATA. But, again, you'll have the father going forward here, all of the facts of that incident, that terrible terrorist incident will be put before the Court and jury in this case in all their detail whether or not those plaintiffs are here. Those plaintiffs deserve an opportunity to have their case heard.

In terms of the depositions, as I say, Revital Bauer, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

the wife, the husband of Alan and the mother of Yehonathon, was deposed already, and she's already had her Rule 35 examination done.

Varda Guetta was deposed already June 28. She had her mental examination June 27 at their demand. And they already have demands out there for immediately taking the depositions and Rule 35 examinations of the other plaintiffs. Well, then they should do it because these claims ought to go forward, your Honor.

I hate to even throw this out here because, again, I don't think we get off first base with these claims, but if we did, then we ought to be able to amend the complaint at this point and name the president and the treasurer of the association and prove to the Court then that the kinds of -- we don't know who their members are, but if they claim the members are these factions, that each one of those factions has a charter and a policy and a practice of engaging, approving and ratifying these kinds of terrorist acts, so that we would get them that way also.

The bottom line is the estate claims ought to go forward for all the reasons we've said, your Honor. I appreciate the time. I know the Court has read the papers. We also rely on the papers. And I don't mean to undercut anything in the papers that I've said here today.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a side question with regard SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

50 C89QsokC1 1 to your Count Six. Why is that an independent count? MR. SCHOEN: Your Honor, it could well be a misnomer considering it to be a cause of action. This is a solatium and 3 4 consortium count. The fact of the matter is, under the ATA we 5 have the right to those kinds of damages. 6 THE COURT: Damages. 7 MR. SCHOEN: Yes, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: That's a determination of damages. That's 9 not, as I understand it, an independent cause of action. You 10 say that you want to allege it as a separate non-federal cause 11 of action. The fact that it may be related to damages in a 12 federal cause of action doesn't make it independently a cause 13 of action unless there is such a cause of action in Israeli law 14 or in New York law, and I fail to find it. 15 MR. SCHOEN: Let me say this, your Honor ---16 THE COURT: I assume you put it in that category of 17 other of common law or non-federal claims, but --18 MR. SCHOEN: Because we believe those kinds of damages 19 are also recoverable under the state. 20 THE COURT: That is what you said, let me go to --MR. SCHOEN: The Court's point is, it's not a separate 21 22 cause of action. I have been in the case two days, and I think 2.3 that's right, and the Court knows it far better than I do, and 24 the Court has been in the case a lot longer. 25 THE COURT: You've talked about garden-variety

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

51 C89QsokC1

non-federal causes of action, such as wrongful deaths, loss of consortium and solatium, assault and battery, negligence and infliction of emotional distress. Then you talk about the five remaining counts: Conscious pain and suffering, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, vicarious liability and respondeat superior and inducement. They set forth theories of liability and/or types of damages available, not separate causes of action.

It seems to me that Count Six falls in that category, not the first category.

MR. SCHOEN: I can't disagree, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24 25 MR. SCHOEN: I hesitate to speak for lawyers who have done ten years of work in the case and I'm in it two days, but that's the way I read it.

THE COURT: That's not determinative of this case. Let me just go back to one other issue with regard to your motion to strike.

MR. SCHOEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me put aside for a second the lack of capacity in the affirmative defense. What is the utility or purpose of striking all of the affirmative defenses at this point or striking anything at this point? I understand the difference between a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike. Why am I striking?

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

MR. SCHOEN: Again, your Honor, I think part of this is -- I will tell you how I read it, your Honor. I have a little bit of my own baggage in this one. The judge I happened to clerk for was real big on this sort of stuff. That is, he would call up the parties at the time and say, listen, you've thrown this in your answer, I don't want this all -- we're going to have a have a trial on that. Let's just clean it up. I think part of that is what this is. For example, one of the objections in the motion to strike is that the defenses are just too conclusory. Then we break it down.

But as to affirmative defenses three and six, we say these allege personal jurisdiction and improper venue, those have already been ruled on. No reason for them to be in the answer. They were dismissed on a motion.

THE COURT: So I ignore them.

MR. SCHOEN: OK.

THE COURT: As I say, it's just a matter of style. You're right. Your judge may have stricken them. I don't even want to spend the time having to argue about striking them. I will just ignore them. If those issues have been resolved, they've been resolved. Every time I dismiss something out of a case, I don't need to go back and rewrite the pleadings. It's not there. My attitude is that if they have alleged sufficiently and put you on notice of any claim, counterclaims, or affirmative defenses, the only question in my mind for me to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

address is whether or not at the end of discovery there is a basis in which to put forth those affirmative defenses in support of a summary judgment motion or to go to a jury with those affirmative defenses.

MR. SCHOEN: I understand, your Honor. I think another issue, just as a matter of law, was plaintiffs take the position that Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses, and we cite a whole host of cases that say that, and say if they can't support these things, they ought to go out --

THE COURT: Which affirmative defense don't you understand that they are asserting and why they are asserting them?

MR. SCHOEN: I think we understand them.

THE COURT: So, what else does Iqbal and Twombly require other than sufficient specificity for you to understand the nature of the affirmative defense so that you can confront that affirmative defense?

MR. SCHOEN: I think specifically, for example, for the fourth defense of lack of capacity, this dovetails with that argument under Rule 9, and, that is, they have the burden of setting out the facts that they know about that make them this unincorporated association.

THE COURT: They don't have to prove it in their answer. They just have to give you notice of what they claim is the nature of the affirmative defense. It seems to me that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

when anyone reads from the plaintiff's side that they were asserting a lack of capacity, that the only reasonable conclusion to reach at that point was that they were asserting a lack of capacity based on the fact that they are not an unincorporated association.

MR. SCHOEN: I hear the Court. I would just say that I think the rules require them to also set out the facts that support it, and, remember, we have this problem with their 26(a) disclosures.

THE COURT: Well, that's a different question.

MR. SCHOEN: That's right.

THE COURT: You could have enforced the 26(a) disclosures or moved on the basis that the disclosures are insufficient, but that doesn't go to the pleadings. The disclosure doesn't go to the pleadings. It goes to whether or not they made sufficient disclosures.

MR. SCHOEN: Yes, your Honor. That's raised in our cross motion, of course. The disclosures were insufficient, and that that's relevant to this issue as well.

THE COURT: Well, the disclosures may be insufficient and may warrant preclusion of certain evidence that wasn't disclosed, but I'm not sure how that independently factors into my evaluation as to whether the pleadings are sufficient. I assume that you would say I should reject their argument that your disclosures were insufficient, so, therefore, you fail to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C89QsokC1

2.3

state a cause of action in your complaint. Those aren't related to each other. Those are two different legal analyses.

MR. SCHOEN: I hear you, Judge.

THE COURT: So, at this point, as I say, my reaction is for the purpose of cleaning up the pleadings, if I spend most of my time trying to do that in cases, I'd be spending a lot more time doing that than concentrating on the merits of the case. With regard to any affirmative defense, I'm not sure that you have articulated which affirmative defense -- I understand your arguments about what issues have already been addressed, and that they're no longer in this case; but with regard to an argument as to any particular affirmative defense, I'm not sure which affirmative defense that you say is inadequately pled on the basis that it is not pled in a manner in which you sufficiently understand what is the nature of the affirmative defense that they intend to pursue in order to defeat liability.

MR. SCHOEN: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, is it your position that -- when you say the underlying facts, I assume it's not your position that even with regard to capacity, if they said that we assert the affirmative defense of lack of capacity because we are an unincorporated association, and, therefore, cannot be sued, you wouldn't argue that some other factual allegation of proof would be necessary beyond that.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

knowledge.

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

MR. SCHOEN: Under Rule 9, I would, your Honor.

THE COURT: What else would you say would be -- they would have to give you the proof on that?

MR. SCHOEN: They have to make the assertion with their defense, and that facts are peculiarly within their

THE COURT: But what facts are peculiarly within their knowledge? If they simply said, we have the affirmative defense, and they didn't articulate this, but I think you understood this to be their position. So if they had specifically articulated in the affirmative defense, that we have the affirmative defense of lack of capacity to be sued because we have been determined to be and we are in fact an unincorporated association which cannot be sued under New York law for these non-federal claims, you are not saying that they would have to lay out in attached chapter and verse what created them and who their members are and how they're an unincorporated association, as long as they put you on -- this is notice to you. Even in terms of affirmative defenses, that is clearly a plausible theory under Twombly and Iqbal, and it's clearly sufficient to put you on notice that they claim to establish as a defense to any cause of action that you might otherwise establish that you have sued an entity which cannot be sued. I'm not quite sure what else you say that they would be required to put in a plea.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.3

context.

MR. SCHOEN: Your Honor, I refer the Court to DE 196 at page 9. We just kind of set out sort of the body of case law starting with the Pressman v. Estate of Steinvorth case. What they say in there in fleshing this out, what do we mean by Rule 9(a) and what's a waiver? They say: He waived the capacity defense by waiting more than seven years before raising it. That's not what your Honor is talking about right now.

THE COURT: But they're not even raising a waiver argument in that regard. You're raising an insufficient pleading argument.

MR. SCHOEN: In this argument, of course, the Court's aware we are waiving the waiver argument but they waited so long -- they raised it first and then they, we say abandoned it, and then raised it again. That's what happened in Pressman.

THE COURT: Slow down. Slow down for a second.

I understood your waiver argument and the failure to sufficient plead the affirmative defense argument to be two separate arguments. Is that not two separate arguments?

MR. SCHOEN: Two separate arguments. The only reason I raise it now is because in Pressman, they put it in that

THE COURT: Right, in the waiver context.

MR. SCHOEN: Not just the waiver -- I'm sorry, your

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1

2.2

2.3

Honor. They say because he failed to be more explicit in his answer, he has waived it. So it's a waiver because he didn't properly or timely raise it. That's an argument we have. And in this context, the way they call it in Pressman is they call it a waiver by not explicitly laying out supporting facts. Rule 9(a) requires not only pleader to make a specific negative averment of the plaintiff's capacity to sue, but also that averment to include "such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge."

In this case, they only asserted that we lacked the requisite standing to bring the case, but they didn't give any particulars or explanation, the Court said, and the Southern District here, the Court said, and, therefore, they waived the issue for not being specifically -- for not laying out the supporting facts. In this case, I would say who the members are, what makes them an unincorporated association, because it gives us notice then.

THE COURT: On what point do you say they waived this because at some point you knew this, so they didn't.

MR. SCHOEN: I still don't know why they claim they're an unincorporated association.

THE COURT: And you say because you don't know at this point why they claim that they're an unincorporated association, that they have waived that argument?

MR. SCHOEN: Yes, your Honor. And I don't believe SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C89QsokC1 they are a membership organization, as we know that to be required under unincorporated association. If they are, I don't know who their members are, and I say -- they do know. If they are going to take the position --THE COURT: But you do know it to one extent. You know it to the extent that they have been determined to be an unincorporated association in other cases, so you are at least -- to sort of say it is somehow a surprise to you that somebody would say this and why they would say that is a little bit --as I said, that's why I say it sounds to me you are making solely a waiver argument. You are not making anything other than a waiver argument. (Continued on next page) 2.3 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C895sok2 argument MR. SCHOEN: It's a waiver and an insufficiency 1 2 argument under Rule --3 THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure -- as I say, I'm not 4 sure that it's a waiver of argument that they didn't put you on 5 notice as to the nature of the affirmative defense so that you 6 can obviously have an opportunity to either move to dismiss it 7 or to explore any discovery. I don't understand that you were 8 in such a position. 9 MR. SCHOEN: Well, we have said we needed discovery on 10 that issue, of course before --11 THE COURT: Right. So, if you get discovery on the 12 issue then why is it waived? 13 MR. SCHOEN: I still think it is a violation of Rule 14 15 THE COURT: Have you requested discovery on that 16 issue? 17 MR. SCHOEN: Yes, your Honor. We have discovery 18 requests for cases in which they've sued and been sued. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. SCHOEN: That sort of thing. THE COURT: Are they somehow in default on responding 21 22 to those outstanding requests? 23 MR. SCHOEN: I don't know the answer to that but 24 they're asking your Honor to dismiss these claims and are 25 saying we don't need any discovery. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C895sok2 argument

THE COURT: No, but I'm not -- I'm not focusing on what they're asking me to do, I'm focusing on what you're

2.3

 asking me do. I mean, you are saying they have waived it even though you targeted a discovery request that is still outstanding, they have not defaulted on appropriately and timely responded to that discovery request. So why, under those circumstances, should I say that they have -- you're in a position to say that you don't understand the nature of their claim and that's sufficient for you to confront and disprove

that affirmative defense?

MR. SCHOEN: Let me put it like this, your Honor.

THE COURT: Or explore that in discovery.

 $\mbox{MR. SCHOEN:} \;\; \mbox{Let me put it like this, if may.}$ 

I think part of the reason for the rule is that requires this so that we are not just engaging in endless motion practice and briefing, let's flesh it out from the start so we know what we're talking about with the answer; not so that, your Honor, we can show up today after all of this motions practice and say -- I don't mean this in any way as a personal attack at all -- but I'm saying from the defendant's perspective, well, I guess we're an unincorporated association because we haven't been anything else so far.

THE COURT: But aren't you already in that position? If you weren't in that position you wouldn't have been in a position to articulate and generate the specific discovery SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

62 C895sok2 argument requests that you say were relevant to that issue. You have 2 already done that. Why would a -- if you have already 3 requested what you know is the relevant inquiry to defeat that 4 affirmative defense or to argue that they produce no proof and 5 so order that from the defendants, in what way should I say 6 that? 7 MR. SCHOEN: If the Court's position is no harm, no 8 foul, in a sense, I hear you. I think there is a foul because 9 I think it cost us a great deal extra time and effort and money 10 and so on having to deal with the issue without knowing --11 without them meeting their obligation because it is part of the 12 same obligation carrying a burden of proof, that is, why are 13 you an unincorporated association, who are your members, how do 14 you establish those things. And in the answer there is a Rule 15 98 for a reason. It distinguishes between lack of capacity and 16 other kinds of other defenses and it says you have to give us 17 the underlying facts. 18 Judge, are we finished? 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. SCHOEN: I mean you make it -- this is what a 21 lawyer lives for, frankly, to have a Court this prepared when 22 we come in here for argument. 2.3 THE COURT: I know. It is important for all parties.

MR. SCHOEN: I very much appreciate it.
THE COURT: I will let them respond.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

24

25

MS. FERGUSON: You have me back again, your Honor. THE COURT: Sure.

2.3

MS. FERGUSON: Just briefly on whether there was sort of a foul in the way in which the affirmative defense of lack of capacity was raised.

The PA and PLO fully briefed this issue back in 2007 and the Court wanted to defer ruling on that question until the threshold of personal jurisdiction issue was resolved. That took some time to resolve and, meanwhile, we preserved our lack of capacity argument and then, of course, raised it in the answer so there has been no waiver, there has been no prejudice. The plaintiff has been on notice since 2007 not just that we intended to raise a lack of capacity defense but of the very nature of the argument and what it rested on because we actually briefed the issue in 2007. So, I wanted to make that point clear.

With respect to the lack of capacity argument, I think it has become somewhat muddled in terms of what the different kind of points of inquiry are and what law one looks to for these different points of inquiry, and I think it is very important to distinguish between the first question of: What kind of entity is this? Is it a corporation? Is it a state? Is it an unincorporated association versus if it is an unincorporated association what law do we look to determine whether it has the capacity to be sued? And my opposing SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

counsel has argued that well, sure, the PLO might be an unincorporated association in a general sense, but under New York Law it is not an unincorporated association. Well, New York Law does not govern the status of the PLO or the PA under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That's become a question of federal common law, the what is it.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

What the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure then tell you is that if the PLO is an unincorporated association, then you go to the law of the forum to determine its capacity to be sued.

There is also this question that sort of comes into play that creates some confusion about, well, who are its members and did its members ratify the unincorporated association's actions. Well, we don't even get to that point because if you accept the premise that the PA and the PLO are unincorporated associations and then you go to law of the forum, New York, it tells you that the unincorporated associations cannot be sued in their own name, they have to be sued in the name of the president or the treasurer. If the plaintiffs had done that, which they didn't, then there would be the question of whether they sufficiently alleged that the members had ratified the conduct. But we don't have that, the valid complaint even moves forward because it named the PA and PLO, not the president or treasurer and the plaintiffs, even though they have been on notice since 2007 that we have this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

2.3

24

25

lack of capacity defense and the nature of that defense, they have not sought leave to amend. They haven't filed a complaint against the president or treasurer. So, the notion that we need discovery to determine every single member of the PLO or whether every single member of the PLO ratified this action, that's putting the cart way before the horse because they don't even have, under New York Law, a valid claim to proceed on because they've sued the wrong entity, or they've sued it in its own name, I should say. So, I wanted to clarify that point as well.

I also think, your Honor, that it would be a mistake to keep sort of kicking this can down the road with respect to these supplemental law claims by suggesting, well, maybe there is some other facts out there that would help us resolve this. These are, I acknowledge, sui generis organizations, the PA and the PLO, but I submit that the plaintiffs have not identified specific discovery that would help us to figure out how, under U.S. law, we are going to treat this sui generis thing that is the PA and PLO and we all sort of know in broad, general terms what they are. They want discovery on, well, I would like to see charters of every individual member of the organization to see if they've ratified it. Well, we don't get to that question. We don't get to that question because they haven't filed a suit against the president or treasurer. So, there is no reason to keep kicking this can down the road because there SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24 25

isn't another avenue with respect to the capacity point. With respect to the supplemental, our sort of additional argument under 1367, I understand your Honor's position that well, yes, it is complex here, but it would be complex against Israel as well and I think it is important to understand that we did raise this argument of lack of capacity back in 2007 when the statute of limitations had not run in Israel. Moreover, this is a highly -- I can't stress enough how difficult it is for the PA and the PLO to litigate complex cases in U.S. Courts and deal with the obligations of U.S. civil discovery. We have been in discovery for quite a time now, this case has been ongoing since 2004, active since 2007. We are getting -- we are getting very near the end of fact discovery. Fact discovery is set to close December 21st. And so, the PA is sort of getting there but now to open up this entire tranche of additional claims involving different sources of foreign law and requiring -- and where all the facts and the experts and the witnesses and the documents, everything is over there, so it is very expensive to litigate it here as opposed to in the region. It is very burdensome. The issues are considerable, considerable expense and delay, and it truly is already a complex case.

THE COURT: Well, the PLO and PA has been involved in numerous litigation in the United States in various courts.

MS. FERGUSON: Yes.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

67 C895sok2 argument 1 THE COURT: I don't know why this is any more 2 burdensome than any other litigation that they must expect, 3 particularly under the ATA, to be involved in. And, as I say, 4 even I if I accept your argument, this case doesn't go away. 5 MS. FERGUSON: No, this case does not go away because 6 under the statute, if a U.S. national has been injured, they 7 have a right to bring suit here. 8 THE COURT: So, I can't give them a more convenient 9 forum, I can only put them into forums which is less than 10 convenient. 11 MS. FERGUSON: But, with respect to embarking on what 12 would be a complicated, lengthy, burdensome process of expert 13

discovery and litigation of numerous foreign law claims --THE COURT: If you don't, give me a scenario where you

won't have to do that anyway. MS. FERGUSON: Well, they should have brought those

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

claims in Israel.

THE COURT: The only argument that I can assume you are making is that if I grant your motion, since they are time-barred in Israel, you won't have to do that again in any other forum because they will have no forum to litigate these common law claims.

MS. FERGUSON: Even if Israel were to toll the statute and allow the claims to move forward.

> THE COURT: Then you would have double work. I mean, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

68 C895sok2 argument 1 how does that --2 MS. FERGUSON: Except the experts are likely to be in 3 the region. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MS. FERGUSON: We will have more access to people that 6 speak those languages in the region. 7 THE COURT: Why is it that you don't have access to 8 those people in the region even if you are litigating 9 ultimately in a case here? 10 MS. FERGUSON: Well, the PA's U.S. counsel doesn't --11 we don't read Arabic or Hebrew. 12 THE COURT: That's not where it should be, that is who 13 the lawyer should be. Get yourself some lawyers who speak 14 Arabic or Hebrew because that is what is going to have to 15 happen. That is not a compelling argument about the forum, 16 that's a compelling argument about who is involved and what 17 lawyers and support staff is involved in litigating. 18 MS. FERGUSON: Your Honor, there is a case in front of 19 the Supreme Court right now, the Kiobel case involving the 20 alien tort statute where the Court is inquiring as to under what circumstances should U.S. Courts exercise jurisdiction 21 22 over claims involving foreign defendants, involving foreign 23 plaintiffs and actions that occur abroad. Now, here there is a 24 statute that says, yes, the U.S. Court will take it if the U.S. 25 national has been injured but now that's become the vehicle for SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

attaching any number of other claims.

2.2

2.3

THE COURT: That arise out of those incidents.

MS. FERGUSON: Right, but that add even more -- that
now have a U.S. Court not just adjudicating a federal statute
but now you have the U.S. Court trying to decide whether under
the law of the West Bank whether they actually recognize a

the law of the West Bank whether they actually recognize claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

THE COURT: You keep saying that but I haven't confronted that in this case yet and I'm not sure on what scenario you say that this Court is going to have to confront that. That has not been an issue that's raised by either party, that somehow that we are going to be trying to decide whether or not the defendants are liable under some other law other than the law -- the ATA and the law that is consistent in both New York and Israel.

MS. FERGUSON: Well, that's where we keep going back to the Second Circuit case that says that the choice of law rules for torts would have the Court, as to conduct-regulating activity, apply the law where the conduct occurred. And some of the conduct here is alleged to have occurred in -- not in Israel but in the West Bank.

THE COURT: Well, that issue, in all of these years, has not been raised in this Court, so now you say that you anticipate that that's what you may raise in the future and make those arguments. There is only a limited amount of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

70 C895sok2 argument consideration that I should give to the fact that you say now, Judge, send it someplace else because we think we are going to 3 raise an issue somewhere down the line that some other law 4 should apply other than the law we have all been talking about 5 all of these years. 6 MS. FERGUSON: Well --7 THE COURT: I mean, you have never raised that issue 8 in this case. That issue has never been raised. 9 MS. FERGUSON: These aren't our claims. 10 THE COURT: That's your claim. That's your issue. 11 They're not raising that issue. 12 MS. FERGUSON: But the complaint, in a way it puts us 13 at a considerable advantage because they don't say what the 14 source of law is for these claims. They definitely don't say 15 it is anything other than New York or Israel. They're silent 16 on it. 17 THE COURT: They're not silent. They specifically 18 said in their papers it is New York or Israel and those laws 19 are not inconsistent with each other. If you have a different 20 position you have not raised a different position with regard to what law applies until today when we started discussing 21 22 this. Anybody is going to raise that --2.3 MS. FERGUSON: Subsequent to the briefing the Second 24 Circuit decision came out holding that it is not the place 25 where the injury or the loss occurs that controls but the place SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

where the conduct occurred. So, there was a recent development that came off our briefs that we alerted the Court to in a letter so that's why this has come up, because there is this recent Second Circuit case decided after the briefing that makes not the law of Israel controlling but the law where the conduct occurred.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

24

25

THE COURT: Well, even if I were to accept all of that argument it does not lead to the conclusion in the abstract that this case should be somewhere other than here because the majority of the activity that's at issue -- the activity that you say you want to rely upon and the situs of the activity that you say you want to rely upon is the minority of the activity that is at issue here, not the majority of the activity that is at issue here. So, you're saying that even though most of the activity affected U.S. citizens in Israel, you say because of the connection with activity that you say is attributed to the PLO or the PA in a different region should compel that the law of that region be applied. It is unlikely that you, on these facts, that that is going to be a compelling argument because that's not -- you have not even articulated that that's -- making that analysis would compel one to say that some other law other than the law of Israel or New York or the ATA should apply. You haven't even articulated such a position.

MS. FERGUSON: But with respect to the plaintiff's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

72 C895sok2 argument 1 claims that the PA and PLO's own conduct creates liability --2 THE COURT: That's a limited part of the claim. That is a limited -- that is not the predominant part of the claim. 3 4 MS. FERGUSON: I am missing, then, what the 5 predominant part of the claim is. 6 THE COURT: The predominant part of the claim is the 7 injury and death that occurred at the locations that they 8 occurred and its effect on United States citizens. That's the 9 primary part of the claim. That's not a sophisticated thing. 10 You are saying that because they say the PLO made some 11 decisions in the region that somehow that should mean that all 12 of these claims should be decided in that region or according 13 to that law. Now, if you want to make that argument maybe 14 there will be appropriate time to make that argument but, right 15 now, as an argument in the abstract, it is not a compelling 16 argument for me to say that, you know, I should -- oh, that's 17 too complicated in this case, it is much less complicated for 18 some other unknown jurisdiction to go do that analysis 19 separately even though we're litigating here, and somehow even 20 a balance of convenience says it is more convenient for that to be done someplace else. You haven't articulated where and how 21 22 it is more convenient or that there is really going to be any 2.3 compelling reason, compelling evidence to indicate that the factors to consider are going weigh, somehow, more heavily 24 25 somewhere else other than Israel or the United States.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

MS. FERGUSON: I would just encourage your Honor to review the recent Second Circuit decision because with respect to the damages issues there you do look to the place where the injury occurred and that would be Israel.

THE COURT: You want me to review --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

MS. FERGUSON: The Second Circuit decision.

THE COURT: I'm aware of the Second Circuit Licci decision. Very familiar with it, even before it was a Second Circuit decision.

MS. FERGUSON: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: I know what the issue is and I know the limited issue that they addressed and I know the more broader issue that I had to address before they got it and I don't think that that changes, at all, my analysis here. Matter of fact, it is very consistent with my analysis here. If you were standing here making an argument that you could articulate a basis to conclude that this litigation is more appropriate someplace else or some law is more appropriate to apply, then the laws that we have been discussing, then that would advance that argument. But, to argue in the abstract, well, we are going to argue at some point that maybe there is connections with the different region and that other laws might be laws that can be considered, that doesn't get you over the hurdle of trying to convince me on this record that I'm aware of at this point that somehow this is more appropriate for a region or to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

74 argument C895sok2 1 apply some laws that are different than either the laws of the 2 United States, New York, or Israel; I just haven't articulated 3 the compelling place or set of laws that should apply instead 4 of those. 5 MS. FERGUSON: I didn't know if it would be useful to 6 have a briefing on some of these choice of law issues. 7 THE COURT: If that becomes relevant at the 8 appropriate time. That's usually my response. 9 MS. FERGUSON: Our foremost argument is the lack of 10 capacity argument, so thank you, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: You're welcome. 12 MR. SCHOEN: May I have a minute, your Honor? 13 THE COURT: Okay. I will give you one minute. 14 MR. SCHOEN: Your Honor, just in brief response. 15 I'm not sure how the last thing fits in with not 16 kicking the can down the road but, in any event, I know 17 Ms. Ferguson is trying but the idea here, it is just 18 transparent. They have different experts in the region. 19 is no special expert for Varda Guetta. There are other mothers 20 in the case who suffered the kind of injury and damage. They're the same experts, that's the whole point here why we 21 22 don't dismiss the case here, it is the same trial. 2.3 THE COURT: I thought she was moreso -- maybe I am 24 incorrect, moreso referring to experts on what law would apply 25 rather than experts. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

MR. SCHOEN: Those were two different subjects. She raised that and then raised this and because she said how difficult it is for them to conduct discovery in the United States. That's an argument for Congress. They're conducting the same discovery -- we have the ATA. Congress made that decision and the Licci case, again, nobody is going to tell the Court about that case, the Court knows the case better than anyone, but that has to do with the American Express Bank there, their only role in the case was transactions. That's not someone situated like Ms. Guetta or these other people because that case is already here. Are you trying that other case? In that case are you not otherwise trying a bank transaction case? The facts of this case are the facts of this case and that doesn't change whether these plaintiffs are in it or these state law claims are in it.

By the way, the idea of this Palestinian law and that they can just throw this out there again, we have lost all concept of burdens here. Again, they are the law. If there is law that's inconsistent or in conflict with New York or Israeli law, they should have told you that. It probably isn't, frankly, because of the mandated authority that operated there but I don't know, we don't need to guess. It is not an issue in this case.

Anyway, thanks, Judge.

2.2

2.3

THE COURT: This is what I am going to do because I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

think it is time to move this case forward so I am going to rule today on both of these motions.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

With regard to the defendant's motion I'm going to deny defendant's motion. I think that in this case that it is inappropriate at this stage of the proceeding to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of capacity on this record. I will do so without prejudice to revisit this issue on a record after discovery.

This is an affirmative defense. It is the burden of the defendant to prove this defense and it is the burden of the defendant to demonstrate on what evidence they intend to prove this defense of a lack of capacity either on summary judgment or before -- quite frankly, I'm not even sure that I can imagine a situation where this is a jury question but, you know, if there are factual disputes it could be possibly. But, clearly, it is the defendant's burden to prove its affirmative defense and having that burden the defendant can't simply rely on the pleadings or prior litigation. It must specifically point to evidence on which they say indisputably demonstrates that affirmative defense to the exclusion of any other conclusion. At this stage of the proceeding defendants have not done that nor are they in a position because no discovery is -- even outstanding discovery requests have not -- related to this issue have not yet been responded to.

So, on this record I think it is inappropriate for me SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

to dismiss this case based on any finding that the defendant has demonstrated and met its burden to demonstrate its 3 affirmative defense of lack of capacity when there is no 4 evidence in this record, there has been no discovery in this 5 case, there isn't even an articulable set of facts that have 6 been developed in this case for me to make a decision that 7 these sets of facts demonstrate the affirmative defense of lack 8 of capacity without disputed evidence and leading to only one 9 conclusion for that, the PLO lacks the capacity and the PA 10 lacks the capacity to sue and be sued on New York Law. In 11 fact, the defendants even raised an additional issue by the 12 discussion today with regard to which actual law applies. So, 13 if the issue is to be whether or not and it is argued that 14 somehow I should decline to assert jurisdiction over these 15 claims because it is a complicated issue to determine which law 16 applies with regard to non-federal ATA claims, then it is 17 obviously I am not in a position if I can't even determine at 18 this point that, which laws apply with regard to these claims 19 that somehow the defendant has already met its burden to 20 demonstrate that it has an affirmative defense with regard to the applicability of New York Law. One cannot argue that some 21 other law other than New York Law would apply, might apply with 2.2 2.3 regard to this or other issues and then say at the same time

that indisputably they have a lack of capacity to be sued because New York Law says that they cannot be sued as an SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

(212) 805-0300

24

25

78

C895sok2 argument unincorporated association. If the defense wishes to prove 2 that affirmative defense and establish that affirmative defense, then they have an obligation to exchange this 3 4 information and the evidence on that that they intend to rely 5 upon, the specific evidence that they intend to rely upon, and 6 then they have an obligation to meet their burden of proof to 7 demonstrate that they are in fact what they wish this Court to 8 conclude at this stage without any evidence in the record 9 that's been developed during this litigation, that they are in 10 fact an unincorporated association. As I stated, I think it is 11 inappropriate for me to simply say that such a determination 12 that that burden is met simply because Courts in other 13 litigation, first with regard to specific issues that the Court 14 was addressing, even with regard to similar issues that have 15 been addressed in this Court, have made a determination that 16 for the purpose of those issues that they would accept that as 17 having a premise and that may prove, in this case, I see no 18 evidence which I can review which gives me basis to understand 19 that any Court has gone through an analysis -- a factual 20 analysis with regard to the nature of the PA and the PLO, its 21 establishment and its organization to articulate on what facts 22 that an independent objective conclusion is to be made, that it 2.3 is an unincorporated association and that its status is an 24 unincorporated association would preclude their bringing 25 non-federal claims under New York or Israeli law. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

So, I'm going to deny that motion because the defendant is not able to demonstrate, based on this record at this stage of the proceeding, that they have indisputably an affirmative defense of lack of capacity that would preclude liability in this case.

2.3

 Also, I am denying the application and decline to assert ancillary pending jurisdiction over the nonfederal claims. In this case, given all the consideration of what factors to consider with regard to assertive or decline to assert jurisdiction, primarily any issues that are determinative here that makes no sense to turn this one case into more than one case in more than one jurisdiction. There is no compelling argument for me to do that. The only compelling argument to, which would give me a scenario that's different than that is that, as I say as I heard it in a movie, to get one big falling object and turn it into a number of big falling dangerous objects isn't a compelling argument.

The only argument that this would somehow simplify rather than complicate for all parties and -- the argument that this would put a lesser burden than a greater burden on any of the parties would simply be the argument that I should decline jurisdiction because it would preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing these claims in any jurisdiction because of the statute of limitations. Again, that is not a compelling argument for me to decline jurisdiction if I know that it SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

simply denies the plaintiff the forum that they have already chosen and they have no reasonable alternative of forum at this point to resolve these issues and they have a legal right to resolve those issues in this forum. If they have a legal right to resolve these issues in this forum it is not compelling to say that I should decline jurisdiction knowing that they will be denied the right to go in an alternative forum because the statute of limitations has already run.

2.3

All of your arguments made with regard to the complication of proceeding with these issues and resolving these other issues, whether they would be in conflict of law issues or issues of practical discovery and trial, I think that this Court will be, whatever issues that this Court is confronted with in court, any additional Court that has to deal with those issues separately are going to also have to be confronted with.

So, I think that this Court, particularly since they are ATA claims and there are ATA claims which will not go away and those claims arise out of the same set of facts and actions which underlie all of the other claims and there is no related claims that don't arise out of the same set of facts, the most efficient and effective way to resolve the issues and the claims that arise out of the activities at issue is in one lawsuit in one jurisdiction and not in duplicate lawsuits in different jurisdictions simply because they're alleged as SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

different causes of action in different jurisdictions under different law.

So, I am going to deny both the motion for partial summary judgment -- I mean motion for judgment on the pleadings and I'm going deny the motion to assert jurisdiction over the pending ancillary claims.

There is also a motion -- I believe that there was also a motion by the plaintiffs to, alternatively, to convert this into a Rule 56 motion. I think that that is inappropriate at this stage of the proceeding. The defendants have not moved on the basis of independent evidence that's been disclosed in discovery. Both sides have clearly given indication and particularly the plaintiffs have given an indication that there is significant other evidence that they would be entitled to review in this issue to combat or to determine whether or not the defendants can assert the affirmative defense and so I think that given the status of discovery and the nature of this issue, that it would be inappropriate to convert this to any other motion and the motion as it was stated.

With regard to the plaintiff's motion to strike, I'm going to deny that motion. I think with regard to the issues that have already been resolved a motion to strike is unnecessary and is not appropriate spending time and effort on that.

With regard to the motion to strike based on waiver or SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

and/or failure to state -- sufficiently state the affirmative defenses, I find that the affirmative defenses, as alleged, 3 have articulated what the nature of the affirmative defenses 4 are and sufficiently put the defendant -- the plaintiff on 5 notice as to what affirmative defenses, the nature of those 6 affirmative defenses, and to the extent that there is a 7 question about the underlying facts which would support those 8 affirmative offenses, I believe that is appropriate for 9 discovery. There it already has been the subject of discovery 10 requests and those issues are to be resolved in discovery. To 11 the extent that defendant does not wish to engage in discovery 12 in those issues that are relevant to any of the affirmative 13 defenses, then they can withdraw those affirmative defenses or

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

those affirmative defenses can be precluded.

So, I think that the appropriate thing is to move forward efficiently with discovery at this point. I think that I am not satisfied with the pace of discovery. I think I told Magistrate Judge Ellis that I expected him to be firm with discovery. I have also indicated to him that any position, if I deny the motions that are on standing here, my issue is going to be that any position is going to be that other than one summary judgment motion after the close of discovery, there are to be no other motions filed without first a pre-motion conference with Magistrate Judge Ellis, and that pre-motion conference must be preceded by no more than a two-page letter SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

indicating what the nature of the motion is that the parties believe are appropriate at this stage of the proceeding and the nature of the motion and the underlying basis for the motion and why the motion is timely made and is not premature in discovery motion.

2.3

I think that the motions that have been made, there have been too many piecemeal motions and I think one issue that we have discussed and I think that primarily some is probably even related to the plaintiff's motion to strike in an attempt to preclude piecemeal, untimely motion, I will be able to preclude that from all parties at this stage of the proceeding. All the motions to dismiss should have been made. If they have not been made I think you need to have a pre-motion conference with the magistrate judge and give him that letter and tell him what motion you intend to make and tell him why that motion is not untimely or premature short of completion of discovery and summary judgment.

So, the parties should move forward to complete discovery, move forward in anticipation of full summary judgment briefing if that's the step to take after discovery, and to anticipate that you will be spending, devoting your time to completing discovery on these issues for the rest of the year rather than engaging in further motions generating other pleadings or generating other claims or affirmative defenses.

So, what I am going to do is I am going to schedule SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

before me -- discovery is supposed to be completed in December. I am going to schedule before me a conference January 17th at 3 10:00. We may not have to meet on that date. If things move 4 efficiently I would anticipate that you would be complete with discovery by then and you can agree upon a motion schedule for 6 full summary judgment submission and you can give me that 7 schedule and then I can, unless there are other issues to be addressed on January 17th, we can move that date until after the summary judgment motion is fully submitted and if you want 10 to be heard on summary judgment motion.

5

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

2.3

24

25

So, as I say, I am going to have further conversation with Magistrate Judge Ellis to make sure that things are moving efficiently and that he makes sure that they're moving efficiently. If, for some reason, there are some applications, letter applications that are submitted to Magistrate Judge Ellis and he holds a pre-motion conference and he determines that it is a timely and not premature motion that should be addressed in substance on its merits, then he can indicate to me the nature of that motion and I will grant him the authority to tell the parties to go ahead and brief that issue for me or for him or make an independent determination based on my review of the nature of the letter response -- the letter and response and the record before him at the conference whether or not that's a motion that is both ripe and timely to be made in this

> SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

85 C895sok2 argument Otherwise, I will see the parties on January 17th at 1 2 10:00 and we will see where we are at that point in time. If any issues arise with regard to discovery, they should be 3 4 raised in writing right away with Judge Ellis. If we need to 5 meet again before that time let me know and I will schedule a 6 conference before me to address any issues that need to be 7 addressed before that time. But, otherwise, I will instruct 8 Magistrate Judge Ellis to make sure the parties are on schedule 9 and move forward efficiently and resolve quickly an issue that 10 might otherwise delay the completion of discovery in this case. 11 Is there anything else we need to address? 12 MR. SCHOEN: No, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Anything else by defense? 14 MS. FERGUSON: No, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Thank you, and I will see you, and good 16 luck and I will talk to Magistrate Judge Ellis as soon as I get 17 off the bench. 18 MR. SCHOEN: Thank you. 19 MS. FERGUSON: Thank you. 20 000 21 22 2.3 24 25

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300